1	Extend	led	Data	1
---	--------	-----	------	---

4

3 Supplementary Note 1: Experimental instructions for Experiments 1-3

5 6

Instruction for Experiment 1 (Trust Game, TG):

Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to you and answer your questions. From now on, communication with other participants is not allowed. Please switch off your mobile phone. Next, you will enter into a repeated game. Your tokens gained in this game depends on your and your matched participants' choices. Your income in this game is 0.05 x your total tokens of 6 randomly selected rounds.

14

15 *The basic game:*

16

1. There are two types of players, namely Player 1 and Player 2.

17 2. In each round, Player 1 is endowed with 100 tokens. Player 2 is endowed with18 0 tokens.

3. Player 1 will determine the amount of investment, while player 2 willdetermine the ratio of return.

4. At the beginning of the experiment, your role will be determined randomly andnot change during the whole experiment.

5. You will only play one role. At the beginning of the experiment, you will
randomly encounter several other participants who play a different role. The partners
you are matched and interacted with are fixed across the whole experiment.

6. At the beginning of the experiment, you will randomly encounter several other participants who play a different role, and you play the game with them throughout the repeated game. For example, if your role is Player 1, you play the game with several fixed Players 2 and vice versa.

30

31 *The rule of player1:* In the whole process of experiment, you will play the game with 32 several fixed Players 2. The number and people you are interacted with will not change 33 during the experiment.

- In each round, Player 1 interacts with each of his/her matched players by inputting 35 his/her investment p. This means giving p tokens to each partner. This also means 36 Player 1 keeps 100 - p tokens, and each matched Player 2 will receive $3 \times p$ 37 tokens. 38 39 After all Player 2 determine the return rate q, we will calculate the return amount 40 Q=3 × p × \bar{q} (\bar{q} is the average of return rate from matched Player 2) according to the 41 investment of each Player1. The final tokens of Player 1 will be the remaining tokens 42 combined with receiving tokens: $(100 - p) + 3 \times p \times \overline{q}$. 43 44 Player 1 will see the below information in previous round on the screen interface, and 45 make the decision for the current round: 46 Your own investment; 47 Each of the return rate of your matched Player 2 (listed by descending order); 48 The average return rate of all your matched Player 2; 49 Your final tokens. 50 51 52 The rule of player2: In the whole process of experiment, you will play the game with several fixed Players 1. The number and people you are interacted with will not change 53 during the experiment. 54 55 In each round, Player 2 will receive the tripled investment from matched Player 1, i.e., 56 $3 \times \bar{p}$ tokens (\bar{p} is the average of investments from his/her partners). 57 58 Player 2 should decide on the amount to return to his/her partners by inputting the 59 60 return rate q. Player 1 will then receive the token corresponding to his/her own investment ,i.e., $3 \times p \times q$. 61 62 Player 2 will see the below information in previous round on the screen interface, and 63
- 64 make the decision for the current round:

65 Your own return rate;

Each of the tripled investment from your matched Player 1 (listed by descendingorder);

The average tripled investment from all your matched Player 1;

69 Your final tokens.

70

Notice: Player 1 and Player 2 will play each round and decide their investment/ return rate simultaneously according to the information of the previous round. After each round, the platform will transform the return rate of Player 2 to the return amount for each Player 1 and calculate the final tokens for each player.

75

76 *The procedure of the game:*

77 Instruction document → check questions → power point illustration → 5 test trials →
 78 formal game.

To make you better understand the rule, after reading the instruction and the specific example, the experimenter will use the power point to illustrate uniformly to all participants. Then you will have 5 test trials before entering the formal game. The game will terminate in 60-65 trials randomly, the whole process of interaction is about 40 minutes.

84

85 *Supplementary illustration:*

Please get familiar with the rule of two roles as your role will be later randomlyassigned by the system.

2. Your role in formal game will be the same as in the test trials. Your matched partnerswill always be the same in the whole process including the test trials.

3. Your tokens earned in the randomly selected round will be transformed into RMB inthe ratio of 20:1.

92

93 *Check questions:*

Below are two specific example, please calculate the tokens Player 1 and Player 2 will

95 receive in these conditions.

- 1. A Player 1 interacting with 5 matched Player 2 chooses to invest 60 96 tokens to each of them which be tripled into 180. The Player 1 receive an average 97 return rate of 0.5. Then the final tokens of Player 1 will be? 98
- 2. A Player 2 interacting with 5 matched Player 1 receives an average 99 investment of 70 tokens from matched partner which be tripled into 210. The 100 Player 2 chooses a return rate of 0.4. Then the final tokens of Player 2 will be? 101
- 102

Answer: 103

- 1. The tokens of Player 1 will be : $180 \times 50\% + (100 60) = 90 + 40 = 130$. 104
- 2. The tokens of Player 2 will be : $210 \times (1 40\%) = 126$. 105
- 106

Instruction for Experiment 2 (ultimatum bargaining game, UBG): 107

Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions 108 carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters 109 will come to you and answer your questions. From now on, communication with other 110 participants is not allowed. Please switch off your mobile phone. Next, you will enter 111 into a repeated game. Your tokens gained in this game depends on your and your 112 matched participants' choices. Your income in this game is 0.01 x your total tokens of 6 113 114 randomly selected rounds.

115

- *The basic game:* 116
- 117

There are two types of players, namely Player A and Player B. 1.

- 2. At the beginning of the experiment, your role will be determined 118 randomly and will not change during the whole experiment. 119
- 120

3. At the beginning of the experiment, you will randomly encounter several other participants who play a different role, and you play the game with them 121 throughout the repeated game. For example, if your role is Player A, you play the 122 game with several fixed Players B and vice versa. 123

4. In each round, Player A and Player B share 100 tokens with his/her 124 matched player. 125

- 126
- In each round, Player A interacts with each of his/her matched players by 5.

127	inputting offer p , which means giving p tokens to each partner. Player B can then					
128	decide whether to accept each of his/her partners' offers by inputting an acceptance					
129	level q , where an offer not less than q will be accepted.					
130	a) If $p \ge q$, the deal is successful. Then, the 100 tokens are allocated					
131	according to Player A's plan. Player A gets $100 - p$ tokens, and Player B gets					
132	p tokens.					
133	b) If $p < q$, the deal is unsuccessful. Then, both Player A and Player B					
134	get 0 tokens.					
135	6. The information of the previous round will be shown on the screen					
136	interface including choices of you and your partners, and your tokens.					
137	7. The total number of rounds is between 60 and 70.					
138						
139	Notice: Player A and Player B make decisions simultaneously. After each round, we					
140	will calculate the tokens for each player.					
141						
142	Example for Player A					
143	Suppose:					
144	1. Each Player A interacts with 4 Player B.					
145	2. Player A's offer is p , and the acceptance levels of the 4 Player B are $q_1 > q_1 > $					
146	$q_2 > q_3 > q_4.$					
147	3. If $q_1, q_2 > p$, $q_3, q_4 \le p$					
148	a) Player A interacts with q_3, q_4 successfully.					
149	b) Player A therefore gets $0 + 0 + (100 - p) + (100 - p) = 200 -$					
150	2p tokens in total.					
151	c) Player A's tokens are $\frac{200-2p}{4}$ (4 is the number of Player A's partners)					
152						
153	Example for Player B					
154	Suppose:					
155	1. Each Player B interacts with 4 Player A.					
156	2. Player B's acceptance level is q , and the offers of the 4 Player A are					

157	$p_1 > p_2 > p_3 > p_4.$
158	3. If $p_1, p_2 > q$, $q_3, q_4 \le q$
159	a) Player B interacts with p_1, p_2 successfully.
160	b) Player B gets $p_1 + p_2 + 0 + 0 = p_1 + p_2$ tokens in total.
161	c) Player B's token are $\frac{p_1+p_2}{4}$ (4 is the number of Player B's partners)
162	
163	Check questions:
164	Below are two specific example, please calculate the tokens Player A and Player B will
165	receive in these conditions.
166	1. One Player A interacting with 4 matched Player B proposes an offer of p and
167	receives the acceptance level of Player B to be q_1, q_2, q_3, q_4 , in which $q_1 <$
168	$q_2 < q_3 < \mathbf{p} < q_4$. Then the final tokens of Player A will be?
169	2. One Player B interacting with 4 matched Player A inputs the acceptance level of q ,
170	and the matched Player A propose offer to be p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4 , where $p_1 < \mathbf{q} < p_2 <$
171	$p_3 < p_4$. Then the final tokens of Player A will be?
172	
173	Answer:
174	1. The tokens of Player A will be : $(300 - 3p) / 4$.
175	2. The tokens of Player B will be : $(p_2 + p_3 + p_4) / 3$.
176	
177	Instruction for Experiment 3 (two-stage Prisoner's Dilemma game, tPD):
178	Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions
179	carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters
180	will come to you and answer your questions. From now on, communication with other
181	participants is not allowed. Please switch off your mobile phone. Next, you will enter
182	into a repeated game. Your tokens gained in game depends on your and your matched
183	participants' choices. Your income in this game is 2 x your total tokens of 20 randomly
184	selected rounds.
185	

The basic game: The experiment consists of two stages: stage 1 and stage 2. The total

- 187 number of rounds is between 30 and 40.
- 188 In stage 1:

189 1. You and your partners should make choices between A and B.

190 2. Your tokens depend on your and your partners' choices.

	(Vour takens, Vour partners' takens)			Your partner's choice				
	(1000 tokens, 1000 partners tokens)			А	В			
	Vour choice	А		(3,3)	(1,4)			
	Your choice	В		(4,1)	(2,2)			
191	Your	tokens	in	stage	1	=		
192	the total score you get from interactions with all the partners							
193	3. The information of the previous round will be shown on the screen							
194	interface including choices of you and your partners, and your tokens.							
195								
196	In stage 2:							
197	1. You and your partners have to choose either \blacklozenge and \clubsuit .							
198	2. Suppose you interact with one partner							
199	a) If you choose ♦							
200	i. If your	partner chose A	in stage	e 1, you and ye	our partner won't	lose		
201	points in this s	tage.						
202	ii. If you	r partner chose B	in stag	ge 1, you have	to pay 2 points.	Your		
203	partner loses 3	points.						
204	b) If you	ı choose 秦						
205	i. Y	ou and your partne	er won'	t lose any points	s in this stage.			
206	Your tokens in stage $2 = \frac{\text{the total score you get from interactions with all the partners}}{\text{the number of your partners}}$.							
207	2. The infor	mation of stage	1 will	be shown on	the screen inter	face		
208	including you and y	our partners' choic	ces.					
209								
210	Tokens calculation							

Your choice in	Your choice in	No. of partners who	No. of partners who	No. of partners who	Your tokens in stage 1	Your tokens in stage 2
----------------------	----------------------	---------------------------	---------------------------	---------------------------	------------------------	------------------------

stage 1	stage 2	choose A	choose B	choose ♦ in			
_		in stage 1	in stage 1	stage 2			
	•				$\frac{3 \times N_A + 1 \times N_B}{N_A + N_B}$	$\frac{-2 \times N_B}{N_A + N_B}$	
A	*	λĭ	NI	λĭ	$\frac{3 \times N_A + 1 \times N_B}{N_A + N_B}$	0	
В	•	IV _A	NB	NB NP	INP	$\frac{4 \times N_A + 2 \times N_B}{N_A + N_B}$	$\frac{-2 \times N_B - 3 \times N_P}{N_A + N_B}$
	*	*			$\frac{4 \times N_A + 2 \times N_B}{N_A + N_B}$	$\frac{-3 \times N_P}{N_A + N_B}$	